Political Studies ISSUE 1-2, 2017

The aim of the article is to analyze populism in relation to its political innovations. The idea is that, if national-populism marks such an impressive rise, it is because it is a carrier, author and driver of main political innovations. The three perspectives in which populism innovates are communications, symbolic politics, post-democracy. The innovation is captured analytically – through concrete political changes, instead of normative ones – as positive political changes. Populism is also a reaction, and an expression of „post-democracy” (Crouch) – the gradual transformation of democratic institutions in empty shells. The neo-liberal globalization and economization of societies shift the energy and innovative engine from the democratic arena to closed politico-economical circles. The far-right populism, on one side furiously criticizes the post-democratic loss of democratic content, and on the other additionally continues to erode it.

Populism as a phenomenon of modern society is fueled by a number of factors – the „rebellion of the masses“, the communication revolution, the globalization and the simultaneous polarization of the world. All of this in turn creates huge and expanding space for ideological substitutes.The author defines populism as a characteristic of political behavior that short- ens the gap between „politicians” and „the people” by eliminating the elite and uncritically accepting mass demands, attitudes and stereotypes. In populism, priority is given to short-term effects as a basis for policy decisions, as well as simplified, one-sided „views” of long-term problems. Populism is a double rejection of the elite – as a privileged social group and as a carrier of specific knowledge.Two types of populism are defined. The first one is tactical, where in a political platform or in a specific political action mass expectations are imposed in order to provide a rating effect. The second one is strategic (positive and negative), where rating decisions are not the „garnish", but the principle, the structure defining factor.The author seeks to answer the questions whether populism is only political stylistics or is it a political ideology and what its historical perspective is.

The main thesis of the text is that populist actors often voice legitimate critiques of the ruling elites in liberal democracies. The alternatives they offer, however, are worse than the illness they claim to cure. There is some merit in their central critique – the global meritocratic elites have betrayed their respective people, as the governing elites in liberal democracies are often too distant from the citizens who elected them to govern. The alternative that the above mentioned critics offer – nationally responsible leadership, claiming to be the unique voice of the authentic will and interests of the people – sounds attractive. Yet it is not credible and moreover, undermines political pluralism – the fundamental presupposition of a well-working liberal democracy. The better alternative, it is argued in the text, are responsive to their citizens, meritocratic pluralistic governing elites.

The article considers populism as a democratic element, not as a phenomenon outside of modern democracy. The arguments of the critics of populism remain on the same rational ground as the populist ideas because they imply a clear and undeniable distinction between the elites and the masses, between the lead- ers and the governed, between the professionals and the ordinary people. The suggestion made is that national populism should not be identified as populism because it is anti-democratic, but as a manifestation of primordial-fascism.

The article traces the main elements, the historical context and the stakes of the discursive theory of populism of Ernesto Laclau, which was further developed by the Essex school of discourse analysis. Laclau’s approach is key, because he articulates a rigorous theory of populism, which is able to save the concept from its excessively pejorative and pre-theoretical (mis)uses that are prevalent today. The main argument is that the critique of anti-populism is amongst the strongest features of the discursive theory of populism. To achieve that, however, the theory risks becoming a general theory of political identification, which may lead to another over-inflation of the term „populism“. A way out of this deadlock is a reflexive turn, by looking into the historical transformations of the very term populism instead. In other words, the strong sides of the theory may be rescued by a refusal of the universal pretentions (to explain every political identification) and, instead, to hold within the researchers’ perspective the historical and contextual trajectories of the populist problem and the populist and anti-populist positions.

The article traces the genesis of the Bulgarian populist radical right (PRR) after 1989. I highlight the interrelations between the stages in the development of the „ethnic model” and the PRR. I examine the electoral dynamics and the leading messages of the party family. The article demonstrates the effects of both the competition and interaction between these formations, on the one hand, and the parties of ‘moderate conservatism’, on the other. Trends in social distances are taken into account when considering the chances of success of ethnic entrepreneurs. On the basis of the analysis, I make a forecast for the future political behaviour of the PRR.

Although populist parties and movements have increased their electoral influ- ence for many years, the economic crises in the Eurozone, as well as the re- cent refugee crisis, have given new impetus to this trend. Both Eurosceptic and anti-elitist discourse, well reflecting broad public attitudes and opinions, fuels populist parties and movements that are becoming increasingly visible in the political arena of the Member-states and at the European level. The aim of this text is to analyze anti-elitism as one of the main characteristics of populism in the context of the mutually reinforcing crises in the EU.

The article presents a corpus analytical examination of political speeches by two leaders known to have voiced populist theses – USA’s newly elected President, Donald Trump and the leader of a nationalist political party in Bulgaria, Krassimir Karakachanov, and one presidential candidate who has not been verifiably ac- cused of such tendencies. The study juxtaposes the key words in their speeches to a list of populist themes derived from theoretical sources for this research. Conclusions are drawn concerning the specific types of populist discourses and the viability of the methodology.

Analysis of the ideological and political symmetries between the period 1924 – 1933 and the first decade of 21st century in Bulgaria. The article describes the youth segment in the far-right movements Kubrat, National Protection, Panbulgarian union „Father Paisij“, UBNL and the Union of Fighters for Development of the Bulgarian, „Defender“. Additionally, the article clarifies the youth profile of fascist and national-socialist ideas and practices.In the contemporary post-communist context there is a consolidation of neo-Nazi youth movements represented by skinheads such as: Bulgarian National Union, „Guardian“, Lukov march, Spisarevski march, the adolescent wing of VMRO. Public actions of members of the above mentioned movements are directed against religious and ethnical minorities; moreover, they are characterized with high level of intolerance, xenophobia and racism.

The paper examines the different basic manifestations of the new populism through the prism of the new realities created by accelerated social change, the mixing of opposing ideological trends and the clashes of radical political ideas and practices. We explore the extreme manifestations of political populism, coupled with irrational utopianism and radical fundamentalism. On the one hand, we have the left-liberal idea of the unlimited development of democracy, of disproportionate tolerance, of achieving equality beyond the law in the name of complete social justice. On the other hand, we have the right-populist answer with the radical language of the hurt traditional culture of primitive everyday life. The classic tyranny of the majority is replaced by the tyranny of constructed political minorities, and their diktat is opposed by the more authoritarian „direct democracy” of the majority of „the people.“ The repressive correctness of populism is a metaphor for the mixing of meanings that practically manifest themselves as their complete opposite. The „political correctness” created in the name of non-violence and culture has degenerated into a political repression of all those who do not think in the paradigm of left-wing ideology. But the answer of the primitive everyday life is the radical national populism combined with far-right anti-liberal and anti-democratic rhetoric.

The culture of jokes, bullshit and parody has invaded the political scene thanks to the digital turn. Ridiculing power is no longer folklore, it seems to have become an integral part of high culture; the ruling elites themselves eagerly make fun of them- selves. We are used to think of satire as an arm of the citizens against power, but could it be that it lulls their vigilance and transforms them into passive observers?