populism

Against the background of the increasingly common opinions about the blurring of the classic division between left and right in politics, in the election campaign the leading Bulgarian parties presented platforms that are largely close to the so-called “left-right consensus”. Both established and emerging political actors have been influenced by strong populist projections, turning the election campaign into confronting impossibilities. The big question is whether this consensus is another sign of the end of the traditional left-right dichotomy or it is another disease of the political systems, which can be overcome precisely by returning to this sustainable division.

The article is positioned within the understanding of populism as a discursive practice and strategy characteristic of all political actors. Such an understanding turns the scope of the concept of populism from ideology or identity, i.e. noun (populist), which is thought and evaluated through the binary opposition populists - non-populists, into a characteristic, i.e. adjective (populist), which can be observed and measured on certain scales. The aim of the research is to apply such a framework regarding the political discourse in the days after the elections for the National Assembly from 4 April 2021.

The paper deals with the interaction of two processes in the European politics: the expansion of the radical right and the outburst of the COVID-19 pandemic. The influential interpretation that the first stage of the coronacrisishas registered the radical right’s failure to use the pandemic politically, is being examined. The text tries to demonstrate that the radical right’s inconsistency and ineffectiveness are genuine, but they do not thwart the classical agenda of ultranationalism, antiliberalism, populism and traditionalism and their reaffirmation in these new conditions. Moreover, the governmental responses to the pandemic in Europe encourage the radical right’s penetration in a new paradoxical field, the defence of democracy. It is concluded that the first months of 2020 have not eroded the ideological potential of this part of the political spectrum and consequently have not destroyed its chances for political rise without predetermining them.

The crisis in 2020, as any crisis, brought many problems but also created opportunities in various areas of human life. In the field of politics, the crisis provided different opportunities for oppositional political actors in Bulgaria to be an alternative to the government, which is incapable of dealing with the biggest social problems, multiplied by the crisis. Chances, however, must be “caught”. If the opposition is not able to make the right decisions in the context of contemporary events, it will lose that political game undoubtedly. Even if, the opposition has all the necessary qualities and the necessary circumstances are there, the essence is contained in the right and prompt decisions.

The paper explores the link between the rise of national-populism and the return of religion to the mainstream of politics. One of the most popular theories explains the rise of populism with a fundamental conservative and religious shift in public attitudes in western countries. The paper tests this hypothesis by an analysis of one of the central themes – the connection between political power and compassion. The main argument is that contemporary populists, as a rule, are indifferent to or even disintegrate the institutional forms of compassion. They most often lower taxes, avoid redistributive policies, do not expand the system of socio-economic rights, and do not strengthen trade unions or NGOs targeting poor people. From this point of view populists use Christianity as a “label” without respecting its doctrinal requirements about compassion. Because of that the new synthesis between religion and politics is very different from traditional forms, as Christian-democracy for instance. Populism relies on the mobilisation of “threatened” majorities: majorities that feel they are loosing social status. Christian identity becomes a marker of the protective stance and closure of these majorities; it is also used as a call for the marginalisation of minorities: migrants, ethnic, sexual and other minorities. The reasons for these processes are at their core political and are not related to deep shifts in fundamental religious attitudes.

The article analyses the problematic nature of the methodological approach examining populism as an ideology. There is an emphasis on several aspects. Firstly, the lack of a worldview, which would give an ideological value of populism. Secondly, on the insignificance of populism understood as lack of ideas for the development of politics, economics and society. Thirdly on its collaboration with left and right ideologies, as well as on the insubstantiality of the ideological approach, in that it draws some of its intuitions from the paradigm that considers populism as a strategy for political mobilization.

Populism as a phenomenon of modern society is fueled by a number of factors – the „rebellion of the masses“, the communication revolution, the globalization and the simultaneous polarization of the world. All of this in turn creates huge and expanding space for ideological substitutes.The author defines populism as a characteristic of political behavior that short- ens the gap between „politicians” and „the people” by eliminating the elite and uncritically accepting mass demands, attitudes and stereotypes. In populism, priority is given to short-term effects as a basis for policy decisions, as well as simplified, one-sided „views” of long-term problems. Populism is a double rejection of the elite – as a privileged social group and as a carrier of specific knowledge.Two types of populism are defined. The first one is tactical, where in a political platform or in a specific political action mass expectations are imposed in order to provide a rating effect. The second one is strategic (positive and negative), where rating decisions are not the „garnish", but the principle, the structure defining factor.The author seeks to answer the questions whether populism is only political stylistics or is it a political ideology and what its historical perspective is.

The main thesis of the text is that populist actors often voice legitimate critiques of the ruling elites in liberal democracies. The alternatives they offer, however, are worse than the illness they claim to cure. There is some merit in their central critique – the global meritocratic elites have betrayed their respective people, as the governing elites in liberal democracies are often too distant from the citizens who elected them to govern. The alternative that the above mentioned critics offer – nationally responsible leadership, claiming to be the unique voice of the authentic will and interests of the people – sounds attractive. Yet it is not credible and moreover, undermines political pluralism – the fundamental presupposition of a well-working liberal democracy. The better alternative, it is argued in the text, are responsive to their citizens, meritocratic pluralistic governing elites.

The article considers populism as a democratic element, not as a phenomenon outside of modern democracy. The arguments of the critics of populism remain on the same rational ground as the populist ideas because they imply a clear and undeniable distinction between the elites and the masses, between the lead- ers and the governed, between the professionals and the ordinary people. The suggestion made is that national populism should not be identified as populism because it is anti-democratic, but as a manifestation of primordial-fascism.

Although populist parties and movements have increased their electoral influ- ence for many years, the economic crises in the Eurozone, as well as the re- cent refugee crisis, have given new impetus to this trend. Both Eurosceptic and anti-elitist discourse, well reflecting broad public attitudes and opinions, fuels populist parties and movements that are becoming increasingly visible in the political arena of the Member-states and at the European level. The aim of this text is to analyze anti-elitism as one of the main characteristics of populism in the context of the mutually reinforcing crises in the EU.

The article presents a corpus analytical examination of political speeches by two leaders known to have voiced populist theses – USA’s newly elected President, Donald Trump and the leader of a nationalist political party in Bulgaria, Krassimir Karakachanov, and one presidential candidate who has not been verifiably ac- cused of such tendencies. The study juxtaposes the key words in their speeches to a list of populist themes derived from theoretical sources for this research. Conclusions are drawn concerning the specific types of populist discourses and the viability of the methodology.

Analysis of the ideological and political symmetries between the period 1924 – 1933 and the first decade of 21st century in Bulgaria. The article describes the youth segment in the far-right movements Kubrat, National Protection, Panbulgarian union „Father Paisij“, UBNL and the Union of Fighters for Development of the Bulgarian, „Defender“. Additionally, the article clarifies the youth profile of fascist and national-socialist ideas and practices.In the contemporary post-communist context there is a consolidation of neo-Nazi youth movements represented by skinheads such as: Bulgarian National Union, „Guardian“, Lukov march, Spisarevski march, the adolescent wing of VMRO. Public actions of members of the above mentioned movements are directed against religious and ethnical minorities; moreover, they are characterized with high level of intolerance, xenophobia and racism.

The paper examines the different basic manifestations of the new populism through the prism of the new realities created by accelerated social change, the mixing of opposing ideological trends and the clashes of radical political ideas and practices. We explore the extreme manifestations of political populism, coupled with irrational utopianism and radical fundamentalism. On the one hand, we have the left-liberal idea of the unlimited development of democracy, of disproportionate tolerance, of achieving equality beyond the law in the name of complete social justice. On the other hand, we have the right-populist answer with the radical language of the hurt traditional culture of primitive everyday life. The classic tyranny of the majority is replaced by the tyranny of constructed political minorities, and their diktat is opposed by the more authoritarian „direct democracy” of the majority of „the people.“ The repressive correctness of populism is a metaphor for the mixing of meanings that practically manifest themselves as their complete opposite. The „political correctness” created in the name of non-violence and culture has degenerated into a political repression of all those who do not think in the paradigm of left-wing ideology. But the answer of the primitive everyday life is the radical national populism combined with far-right anti-liberal and anti-democratic rhetoric.

The culture of jokes, bullshit and parody has invaded the political scene thanks to the digital turn. Ridiculing power is no longer folklore, it seems to have become an integral part of high culture; the ruling elites themselves eagerly make fun of them- selves. We are used to think of satire as an arm of the citizens against power, but could it be that it lulls their vigilance and transforms them into passive observers?

The present study analyses the presidential electoral campaigns of Ivaylo Kalfin, candidate supported by a coalition of parties around the party „Alternative for Bulgarian Revival“, and of Tatiana Doncheva, supported by the coalition ”Move- ment -21” and “National Movement for Stability and Progress”. Both of them are known personalities, confirmed politicians with their expertise, qualities of technocrats and with their criticism against the ramping populism and the risks of authoritarian and undemocratic tendencies. Despite their qualities and professional electoral campaigns, they didn’t’ have room to successfully challenging the strong protest antiestablishment and populist candidates at the first round of the presidential election held on November 6th 2016. Furthermore, they are positioned and known as politicians on the center and center-left where one of the main political forces – the Bulgarian Socialist Party raised and supported a candidate who have never been a politician, offered the alternative of a “new face” in politics and aggregated the protest vote against the GERB party. Voices of expertise, experience and professionalism have been muted by the populist candidates.